The third, Idola Fori, describes the effect of our interaction with our surroundings, especially our social and professional contacts. Dror determines that forensic scientists see themselves as police detectives, and therefore identify with the need to use the evidence to point to a specific suspect and often one that is already in custody. The second, Idola Specus, focuses on the personality, education, experience and world-view. Thus, Dror notes, the combination of high professionalism and the cumulative discovery of evidence causes forensic scientists to fix on a theory already in the first stages of their work and they find it hard to abandon it for another. The first, Idola Tribus, defines our limitations as members of the human race, and especially our difficulty in looking beyond the confines of our point of view. He opens the article with a question that strategists and soldiers will empathize with: is forensic science actually a science and can one conduct a critical discussion of its paradigms? After concluding that it is indeed a science, he approaches it via Francis Bacon's four idols that bias human scientific research and uses them to analyze the failures of forensic scientists. In an article titled How can Francis Bacon help forensic science? The four idols of human biases he characterized the difficulties of forensic science in managing the biases of human thinking. Researcher Itiel Dror reached a different conclusion. Nothing like the uncertainty, and often chaos, of the strategic environment and even more so of the battlefield. The latter come to a scene after the event has occurred if the police did its job properly, the scene will be closed, and the analyst can do his job of collecting evidence in relative quiet and concentration afterwards he takes the findings to a laboratory and use the tools of science (chemistry, biology, physics…) to arrive at scientific conclusions. It is reasonable for strategic and operational planners to envy crime-scene forensic analysts. The time has come to connect the cognitive and cultural biases to the conduct of war and to significantly and essentially expand the conduct of perception manipulation. For reasons elaborated, Western armies find it difficult to meet the challenge of Perception Management. A realm so sensitive to cognitive biases provides fertile fields for actions designed to influence perceptions and consequently the decisions of the rival in our favour. Therefore, it is susceptible to what behavioural economists call 'cognitive biases' expressed in heuristics, choices based on intuition that affect human judgement and weaken the theory of rational decision making. "Warfighting is fundamentally a human activity, in which humans choose what to do, consciously or subconsciously rationally, irrationally or non-rationally", states Jim Storr.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |